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tend so far as to be an all-risk coverage. The suggestion has been made
that emphasis in deciding a mysterious disappearance claim should be
placed on the "mysteriousness" of the loss. 4 0 This approach seems
reasonable if, as in Hammontree, it is applied so that the insured has
the initial burden of showing a "mysterious disappearance," where-
upon the burden shifts to the insurer, who, in order to deny the claim
must show a rational explanation for the disappearance.
RONALD W. SOMMtFR
MANDATORY PACKAGE LICENSING AS PATENT MISUSE
A patent is a seventeen year monopoly, granted under author-
ity of Congress on new inventions and processes.' This monopoly2
gives the patentee the "exclusive right to manufacture, use and sell
the invention [or process] which is disclosed."3 In the exercise of this
"exclusive right," a patentee is privileged to impose any conditions
which "are normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary re-
10Kelly, supra note 16, at 82. Note, 24 La. L. Rev. 930, 934 (1964).
135 U.S.C. § 154 (1958). Title 35 contains the basic law concerning patents,
while the constitutional basis for patents is found in article I, § 8 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States: "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Various
statutes contain provisions relating to patents. E.g.. Arms Control and Disarmament
Act, 75 Stat. 634 (1961), 22 jU.S.C. § 2572 (1958); Atomic Energy Act, 73 Stat. § 73
(1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2188 (Supp. V, 1958).
qPrecisely speaking, a patent is not a monopoly. The term "monopoly" connotes
the gaining of control over an existing market or product. A patent does not give
such control, for there is not an existing market or product over which the patentee
may gain control. The patentee may create a market for his invention by developing
it commercially, but he is not bound to do so. A monopoly takes something from
the public; a patent recognizes an addition to the sum of human knowledge. United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). "The Monopoly of a pat-
ent is distinguishable from a monopoly, as that term is used generally, and in the
antitrust laws." Sperry Prod., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901, 927
(N.D. Ohio 1959). Patent monopoly has been defined as a "privilege,"
Merciod Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944); as a "public wel-
fare monopoly," Wood & Johnson, Patents and the Antitrust Laws, 1950 U. Ill. L.F.
544, 546; as "property," Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415
(1945). The doctrine of Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942),
however, by permitting infringement if a patentee misuses his patents, amounts to a
judicially sanctioned expropriation because one has violated the law.
sAmerican Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir.
1959). -
CASE COMMENTS
ward for the patentee's monopoly."'4 The basic restriction on the pat-
entee is that he is not authorized to extend his monopoly beyond
the scope of the patent.5 Such an extension constitutes patent misuse
and is an absolute defense against the patentee's suit for infringement,
even though the defendant did in fact infringe upon the patents.6
Patent misuse results either when the patentee has violated the anti-
trust laws, 7 or when he has acted in contravention of patent law.8
'In United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.s. 490 (1926), Chief Justice Taft
writes, "It would seem entirely reasonable that he [patentee] should say to the licen-
see, 'Yes, you may make and sell articles under my patent, but not so as to destroy
the profit that I wish to obtain by making and selling them myself.'" Id. at 49o . Ac-
cord, General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938) and
Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., 73 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1934).
%Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 664, 665-66 (1944).
OId. at 668-69. The Supreme Court held that patent misuse barred recovery
against a contributory infringer, i.e., one who aids a direct infringer, usually by sell-
ing needed items to him, as well as against a direct infringer. Misuse of patents not
sued upon, however, will not bar recovery. Apex Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Altorfer Bros., 238
F.2d 867, 872-73 (7th Cir. 1956). The misuse of one patent sued upon, however,
may bar recovery as to other patents sued upon, even though they were not misused.
Sylvania Ind. Corp. v. Visking Corp., 132 F.2d 947, 956-57 (4 th Cir. 1943). The patent
misuse doctrine originated in 1917 with the case of Motion Pictures Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), which held that a patent did not
confer any power upon a patentee to condition the granting of a license upon an
agreement by the licensee to use certain unpatented materials in conjunction with
the patented product. Prior to this time, patent holders lived in the " 'golden
days' of patent protection." Wood, Patents, Antitrust and Prima Facie Attitudes,
50 Va. L. Rev. 571, 574 n.7 (1964). Before 1917 the prevailing judicial attitude to-
wards patents was set forth by Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), which up-
held a patentee's requirement that a licensee use unpatented supplies made by
the patentee in conjunction with the patented product. After the Motion Pictures
case, a series of cases held that similar licensing policies constituted patent misuse.
Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Leitch Mfg. Co.
v. Barber, 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
448 (1942); B. B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Min-
neapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 293 (1947). Patent misuse has also been found when a patentee pursues a
policy of patent licensing with the added control of a price fixing or minimum
price maintenance clause. See, United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371
(1952); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386 (1945); Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3 d
Cir. 1956). It has also been declared an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly
to forbid licensees to manufacture competing articles. National Lockwasher Co.
v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943).
7Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., supra note 6; Mer-
coid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., supra note 6; Sylvania Ind. Corp. v. Visking
Corp., supra note 6.
8 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., supra note 6; Motion Pictures Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra note 6.
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Since patent misuse can be predicated solely upon patent law, a finding
of patent misuse does not necessarily establish an antitrust violation;
but a finding of an antitrust violation when patents are involved
necessarily establishes patent misuse.
The question of whether or not the conditions imposed upon a
licensee were so unreasonable as to exceed the scope of the patent
monopoly was presented in the recent case of International Mfg. Co.
v. Landon, Inc.9 wherein, Landon sued International for infringement
of two patents.10 International defended on the ground that Landon's
policy of only licensing the patents together, a policy commonly
known as mandatory package licensing," constituted patent misuse. To
obtain a license under one patent, International was also required to
take a license under the other patent.' 2
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Interna-
tional's defense of patent misuse. It found that the nature of the
patents prevented one from being developed commercially without
infringing upon the other, and ruled the two packaged patents did
not have any commercial value unless used conjunctively. Since com-
mercially dependent patents, commonly referred to as blocking pat-
ents,' 3 were involved, the court held they constituted only a single
article.
In determining if mandatory package licensing constitutes patent
misuse, the court emphasized the importance of determining whether
blocking or competing patents are involved. If competing patents,
or patents that can be developed independently of one another, are
involved, mandatory package'licensing constitutes patent misuse since
it requires the licensee to accept unnecessary or undesired patents.' 4
9The district court decision on this case was not reported. This comment will
deal exclusively with the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
336 F.2d 723 (1964).
"0The two patents were granted originally to Robert M. Pace and to David
K. Cavenah and Paul J. Steffan. Both were subsequently assigned to Landon. The
Pace patent "is for a fluid recirculation system especially adapted for use in swim-
ming pools, having a filter which can be cleaned without backwashing and with
provision for recirculation of overflow and surface skimming of the pool. "The Cave-
nah patent ... embodies the basic combination of the Pace patent but... adds addi-
tional structure and function which makes it possible to vacuum the pool." Id.
at 725.
nAmerican Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., supra note 3.
"International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., supra note 9, at 729.
1id. at 730.
'4 "In our opinion this distinction is an important one .... The evil of manda-
tory package licensing in that case [involving competing patents] was that the pros-
pective licensee ... would be compelled to accept licenses under patents that were
not necessarily needed. The same evil does not arise in mandatory package licensing
of blocking patents." Id. at 729.
CASE COMMENTS
Since this evil does not exist when blocking patents are involved, man-
datory package licensing of blocking patents does not constitute patent
misuse.
In upholding Landon's licensing policy, the Court of Appeals
noted the public benefit to be gained from the package licensing
of blocking patents. The court said that when such patents are in-
volved, "licensing them in a package deal appears to be the most
practical way of making them available for public use."'15 The court
also pointed out that Landon offered these licenses freely and on
"uniform terms and conditions."' 6 This nonrestrictive offer of license
would enable a large number of manufacturers to use the patents,
thereby assuring wide distribution of the patented product.
The major obstacle faced by the circuit court in holding that
mandatory package licensing did not constitute patent misuse was
the sweeping denunciation of that practice as announced in American
Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,17 which involved thirty-five
patents covering apparatus and process in the flat glassmaking field.
Shatterproof applied to the Securit Co. for a license under some of
these patents, but was told that a license would be granted only if
Shatterproof accepted a license under all thirty-five patents. Shatter-
proof refused to take such a license and began commercial production
without being licensed. The Securit Co. sued for infringement but was
barred from recovery by a finding of patent misuse.' 8 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that mandatory package li-
censing constituted patent misuse since it was an unlawful extension of
the patent monopoly.
The Ninth Circuit avoided the force of the Securit decision by
pointing out that Landon involved blocking patents while Securit




'he Third Circuit Court could also have based its finding of patent misuse
on Securit's attempt to enforce payment of royalties for all patents in the package
up until the expiration date of the most recently issued patent. Since such an ar-
rangement forces the licensee to pay royalties under patents which have expired,
the court ruled this was an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly of those
patents which would still be in effect. Id. at 777-78.
" International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., supra note 9, at 729. But "Mhe only
authority appellee [Landon] advances for limiting the Securit case to licenses of
competing patents is a student article... No reported case has followed the
author's suggestion for limiting the Securit case, and many secondary authorities
discuss the Securit case without advocating this limitation." Appellant's Reply
Brief for Appellant, p. 15.
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indicate whether it involves blocking patents, competing patents, or
both; and it contains such a broad denunciation of mandatory pack-
age licensing that it seems to apply to any patents:
"Whatever may be the asserted reason or justification of the
patent owner, if he compels a licensee to accept a package of
patents or none at all, he employs one patent as a lever to com-
pel the acceptance of a license under another. Equity will not
countenance such a result. We conclude that the court below
committed no error in finding that the defense of misuse as-
serted by Shatterproof is a valid one." 20
Although the court in Landon relied upon the blocking-compet-
ing patent distinction, other grounds have been used to support a
finding of patent misuse. In Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine
Research Corp.,21 the United States Supreme Court held that patent
misuse exists when the prospective licensee only desires a license
under some of the patents in the package, but is required by the
licensor to be licensed under all the patents in the package. The Court,
as in the Securit case, did not consider whether the patents were com-
peting or blocking, but elected to base its finding of patent misuse on
the element of coercion. If a patentee uses package licensing to force
a licensee to take a license under undesired patents, coercion exists
and there is patent misuse.
Irrespective of whether the patents in the mandatory package
are "blocking" or "competing," it can be argued that the presence
of coercive elements in mandatory package licensing may cause
two undesirable results. Firstly, the prospective licensee may believe
that he can produce a commercially feasible product under only part
of the package license. Due to mandatory package licensing, however,
the licensee will be required to take a license under patents which are
unnecessary. If prospective licensees are required to take unnecessary
patents, the incentive to produce new products, which could be used
-American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., supra note 3, at 777. (Em-
phasis added.) The Securit decision also stated: "Each patent gives to its owner
a monopoly in respect to its disclosures, so much and no more .... That invention
is what the patent grant protects by the monopoly, not that invention plus some
embellishment, improvement, or alternate product or process, which also happens
to be patented." Id. at 777. The court also commented specifically on mandatory
package licensing: "Mandatory package licensing is no more than the exercise of
the power created by a particular patent monopoly to condition the licensing of
that patent upon the acceptance of another patent but that is too much. The
protection, or monopoly, which is given to the first patent stops where the monopo-
ly of the second begins." Id. (Emphasis added.)
139 U.S. 827 (1950). Although the court used the test of coercion, patent
misuse was not found.
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with only part of the package license without infringing the other part,
will be destroyed, or at least reduced.22 This result would conflict
with the basic purpose of patents, which is to promote the develop-
ment of new products. 23 Secondly, the patentee may use mandatory
package licensing to protect a patent which might be declared invalid
if attacked in court.24 By tying a known valid patent to a legally
questionable one, the licensor protects the questionable patent since
one who takes a license under a patent is estopped to attack the valid-
ity of the patent.
2
5
Coercion, and the blocking-competing patent distinction, however,
are not the only grounds which courts have used to determine if
patent misuse is present. In International Salt Co. v. United States,26
the Supreme Court examined the elements of market dominance and
the effect upon competition in determining the existence of patent
misuse. The Court held that the fact patented products are involved
in a tying arrangement is not significant in determining the legality
of that arrangement.27 The International Salt Co. only granted li-
censes to use its patented salt dispensing machines if the licensee
agreed to purchase the salt to be used in these machines from the
International Salt Co. The Supreme Court, in holding this to be an
unlawful arrangement because it substantially lessened competition,
stated that "International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which
its patents afford no immunity from the antitrust laws. ' 28
Although the Supreme Court has never passed directly29 on
22This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on
the basis that it posed a hypothetical set of facts not involved in the Landon case.
International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., supra note 9, at 731. It is submitted that
the problem of mandatory package licensing is of such significance that the court
should have been willing to examine this "hypothetical" situation since the impact
of its decision will be widespread.
3Supra note i.
-4This argument was also made in the Landon case by the International
Mfg. Co., and was rejected on the grounds that it, too, involved a "hypothetical"
situation. Internationl Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., supra 9, at 73s.
nThe granting of a patent by the Patent Office establishes the validity of that
patent, but the validity may still be contested in court. A court decision that the
patent is valid, therefore, greatly enhances the value of the patent.
-332 U.S. 392 (1947)-
rNorthern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), cites the International
Salt decision with approval, commenting that the Supreme Court in that case
held the attacked tying arrangement illegal despite, not because, of the fact that
patented products were involved. Id. at 9.
^International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 26, at 396.
-"The Supreme Court has, however, recognized the defense of patent misuse in
dictum when mandatory package licensing is involved. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co.
v. Hazeltine Research Corp., supra note 21.
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whether mandatory package licensing of blocking patents constitutes
patent misuse, the Court has passed on the legality of a patent pool
involving blocking patents. This arrangement is somewhat similar
to mandatory package licensing.30 In United States v. Line Material
Co.,3 ' the Court in dictum stated that absent a price-fixing agree-
ment,32 a patent pool is desirable when blocking patents are involved.
The Court reasoned that a pool of blocking patents benefit the con-
suming public and the patentee by promoting the commercial develop-
ment and distribution of the patented product.3 3 Similar reasoning
is used in the Landon decision to uphold the licensing procedures.
3 4
The commercial and public benefits to be gained from pools of
blocking patents is also emphasized in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,35 wherein patents covering processes for obtaining gasoline from
crude oil 6 were held by several different oil companies. To utilize
these patents effectively, these companies agreed to an exchange of
patent rights. The Supreme Court upheld the legality of this agree-
ment and commented:
"An interchange of patent rights... is frequently necessary if
technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened
litigation. If the available advantages are open on reasonable
terms to all manufacturers desiring to participate, such inter-
change may promote rather than restrain competition.
37
The Court in Landon relied heavily upon this argument, apparent-
ly because of Landon's showing that licenses were granted freely and
on uniform conditions.
38
In passing upon the legality of block-booking, 39 which is the
copyright 40 equivalent of mandatory package licensing, the Supreme
30A patent pool is an arrangement whereby each member of a group of patent
holders grants to all other members of that group the right to use his patent in
return for a similar grant. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
-1 Id. at 287.
='Since there was a price-fixing agreement attached to this patent pool, the
Court did find patent misuse. Id. at 311.
'4d. at 297.
3'International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., supra note 9, at 729-30.
' 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
'01The process involved "cracking" the crude oil molecule. Id. at 167.
'MId. at 171. (Emphasis added.)
-"International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., supra note 9, at 729.
-In block-booking of films, the holder of a copyrighted film merely refuses
to grant a license to use that film unless the prospective licensee agrees also to accept
other films owned by the licensor.
41'he closely related nature of patents and copyrights is the reason that the
Supreme Court refers to both patent and copyright cases when dealing with a
block-booking arrangement. Not only are patents and copyrights related in that
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Court has commented in dictum upon patent misuse. In United
States v. Loew's, Inc.,41 the Court compared this copyright case to
earlier cases involving patent misuse, and ruled that Loew's block-
booking policy constituted an antitrust violation. After noting that
one of the objectives of the Patent Code is to reward uniqueness, the
Court stated that the existence of a patent or copyright "establishes
a distinctiveness 42 sufficient to conclude that any tying arrangement
involving the patent product would have anticompetitive conse-
quences."43
Block-booking is also condemned in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 44 wherein the Supreme Court held that block-booking
is an illegal attempt to use one copyright monopoly to acquire still
another monopoly.4 5 In condemning this block-booking arrangement,
the Court compares such an arrangement to a patentee's attempt to
tie one patent to another patent, as in mandatory package licensing: 46
"Each [copyrighted film] stands not on its own footing but in
whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have....
[T]he result is to add to the monopoly of the copyright in
violation of the principle of the patent cases involving tying
clauses"
47
Thus, the Supreme Court in dictum seems to be ruling that manda-
one covers innovations in the scientific field while the other covers innovations in
the literary field, but they both have the same constitutional basis. See note i.
41371 U.S. 38 (1962).
'This view that a patent establishes "distinctiveness" is in direct contrast
with the theory expounded by the Landon case that blocking patents may be said
to constitute a single article. See International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, supra note 9,
at 730.
'United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 41, at 46.
44334 U.S. 131 (1948).
'But cf. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the requirement that the licensee
assign back to the licensor improvement patents applicable to the patented ma-
chinery. The Court acknowledged that such is the use of "one legalized monopoly
to acquire another legalized monopoly." Id. at 644. The court condones this, how-
ever, because its effect does not militate "against the public interest." Id. at 645. But
the Court recognizes the "possibilities of abuse in the practice of licensing a patent
on condition that the licensee assign all improvement patents to the licensor.
Conceivably the device could be employed with the purpose or effect of violating
the anti-trust laws." Id. at 646. Due to the possibilities of abuse, the Court specific-
ally limits the scope of its decision by concluding: "We only hold that the in-
clusion in the license of the condition requiring the licensee to assign improvement
patents is not per se illegal and unenforceable." Id. at 648.
10Mandatory package licensing is, of course, only a specialized form of a
tying arrangement which involves licenses rather than the usual commodities.
17United States v. Paramount Pictures, supra note 44, at 158. (Emphasis added.)
